The study of economies and markets with dispersed information has attracted much attention since the pioneering work of Radner (1979) and Grossman (1989) . The importance of informational efficiency in markets is well understood (see Vives 2008) . In a relatively recent development, the analysis of complementarities has been advanced by tools from the theory of supermodular games (Vives 1985 (Vives , 1990 Roberts 1990a, 1990b; see also Vives 2005 for a survey that includes games of incomplete information). In many situations, strategic complementarity interacts in a rich way with information structures to provide deeper insights into the workings of the economy. The papers in this Symposium present the state of the art in the field-from theory to empirics and experiments and from the analysis of markets to the analysis of organizations.
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The contribution by George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan analyzes economies with private information. The objective is to design taxation instruments, contingent on ex post public information on fundamentals and aggregate activity, that will improve market allocations when the government cannot observe the dispersed information that agents have on aggregate shocks. The idea of using Pigovian taxes to correct for inefficiencies in the use of information (in addition to correct for payoff externalities) is natural. The authors find that, when agents have private information about aggregate shocks, it is essential to condition on the level of aggregate activity in order to attain efficiency. This is in contrast to the cases of symmetric information or pure private values (with information on idiosyncratic shocks), where conditioning on the realized fundamentals is enough to attain efficiency. Indeed, the imposition of taxes based on ex post realizations changes the incentives faced by agents. An agent who expects marginal taxes to increase with fundamentals will tend to respond less to any source of information about fundamentals. An agent who expects marginal taxes to increase with aggregate activity will tend to rely less on information signals that contain more correlated noise, because he will perceive less complementarity between his action and the actions of others (the link is that more correlated signals help better forecast the actions of others). By choosing appropriate tax weights on ex post fundamentals and aggregate activity, tax policy can be designed to restore the efficient use of information. In particular, the authors show that the impact of noise on equilibrium activity can be reduced without dampening the influence of fundamentals.
The paper builds on a static linear-quadratic model (developed in Angeletos and Pavan 2007) where the payoff to an agent depends on her own action, the average action and its dispersion, and an idiosyncratic shock and its average. The efficiency concept used is team efficiency, where the planner can recommend to each agent a strategy that depends only on the agent's information. A key element of the equilibrium characterization is the degree of strategic complementarity α observed in equilibrium relative to the efficient value α * (basically, the slope of the player's best response as a function of the aggregate action). With only aggregate shocks and a Gaussian structure, it is found that the signal-to-noise ratio in aggregate activity is inefficiently high if and only if α > α * (all this is linked to overreaction to sources of information with correlated noise and excessive nonfundamental volatility). The authors go on to introduce corrective taxes (contingent on the individual action, the average action, and its dispersion as well as on the average value of the fundamental) and show the need for using marginal taxes contingent on the level of aggregate activity in order to implement an efficient allocation when there is private information. The results are robust to the introduction of measurement error in the government's observation. Finally, a dynamic model is analyzed where both payoff and information externalities are present in a Gaussian information structure in which agents observe noisy public signals of past activity in addition to private and public signals on the common fundamental. This model builds on the dynamic learning models of Vives (1993 Vives ( , 1997 -and the extension in Amador and Weill (2007) -to encompass payoff externalities. For the efficient solution the authors must restrict attention to strategies that are linear in the history of private signals. The result, as in Vives (1997) , is that the efficient solution calls for extra weight to private information in relation to the equilibrium solution (this is equivalent to requiring that agents perceive a lower degree of strategic complementarity). This internalizes the information externality. Finally, it is found that once information is used properly, more information cannot hurt. This paper opens the way for the design of policy measures that correct for inefficiencies stemming from the use of information by agents, and it is bound to be relevant in a wide range of applications including business cycles, financial markets, and fiscal policy.
Dirk Bergemann, Xianwen Shi, and Juuso Välimäki discuss auctions with endogenous information acquisition. There is by now a small literature on the topic (see, e.g., Matthews 1984; Stegeman 1996; Persico 2000) . In this paper, each bidder bears a cost of acquiring information about her payoff type. Information acquisition decisions are taken simultaneously and covertly before the auction takes place. The authors also assume that values are interdependent, that information acquisition is binary (i.e., a bidder can either be informed or uninformed), and that utility is linear. The object is allocated according to a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The authors consider pure and mixed equilibria of the information acquisition game and compare them with the socially optimal solution. The main results are that, with positive interdependence, bidders acquire too much information in equilibrium and that the information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes. In fact, it is shown by example that positive interdependence is not a sufficient condition for the bidders' decisions to be strategic substitutes. Thus, positive interdependence is compatible with insufficient information acquisition due to strategic complementarity. Finally, the authors relax some of the main assumptions and show how the results can be extended to a nonlinear environment. This paper opens the way for creating policies (e.g., participation fees and random assignment of the object) that correct the incentives to acquire information. It would be interesting also to consider the case where information acquisition is open and observable. In a Cournot market context, see Hauk and Hurkens (2001) for the covert acquisition case and Vives (1988; 1999, Ex. 8.15 ) for the open acquisition case. In this latter case, strategic complementarity or substitutability at the market stage translates into strategic complementarity or substitutability at the information acquisition stage.
Jayant Ganguli and Liyan Yang consider a noisy rational expectations model in the tradition of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) . This paper shows that, if traders can acquire information about the supply of the stock in addition to its payoff, then multiple equilibria arise and information acquisition decisions can be strategic complements. If we assume that there is a positive correlation between the aggregate endowment shock and the idiosyncratic endowment shock of a trader, then either there is no linear partially revealing equilibrium or there are two linear partially revealing equilibria. In one equilibrium, prices become more informative about the fundamental value as the proportion of informed traders increases; in the other equilibrium, the opposite happens. The price in the second equilibrium is more informative about the fundamental than is the price in the first equilibrium. The first equilibrium shares the features of the equilibrium in Grossman and Stiglitz, and information acquisition decisions about the fundamental value are strategic substitutes; in the second equilibrium, they are strategic complements. This second equilibrium would be unstable according to the usual price adjustment dynamics. Furthermore, as the correlation between the aggregate endowment shock and the idiosyncratic shock tends to zero, the first equilibrium converges to the (unique) partially revealing equilibrium in Diamond and Verrecchia and the second equilibrium to a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. Multiplicity of equilibria arises in the Ganguli and Yang model because a trader's individual endowment shock helps extract information about the fundamental value from the price (which depends on the aggregate endowment shock). A high level of price informativeness is selffulfilling. For example, it implies that an informed trader puts less weight on his endowment shock when trying to estimate the fundamental; this translates into a smaller weight on the aggregate endowment shock in the price, thereby making it less noisy.
Strategic complementarity in information acquisition may lead to multiple equilibria in the information market. The authors extend the model to allow traders to receive information on both the fundamental and the supply shock (instead of each trader receiving a random shock to his endowment). In this model there are also two linear equilibria, in which information acquisition decisions may be strategic complements or substitutes depending on information parameters. Strategic complementarity occurs because, with more informed traders, the statistical identification problem for the uninformed may become worse.
This paper adds to the growing literature that introduces strategic complementarities in versions of noisy rational expectations models (for a summary of the contributions, see e.g., Barlevy and Veronesi 2000; Veldkamp 2006; Chamley 2007; Vives 2008, Chap. 4) . It may have interesting implications for a range of issues, including the cost of capital for firms. It would be worth exploring the robustness of these results to the case of imperfectly competitive traders.
Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Joan de Martí look at information gathering in organizations. Although the theory of information aggregation in networks is still in its infancy, there are some interesting contributions in the literature. To mention a few, Bala and Goyal (1998) , Gale and Kariv (2003), and DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zweibel (2003) have investigated the diffusion of information in networks and provided results on the convergence of beliefs and the efficiency of information aggregation. The martingale convergence theorem is a powerful tool for studying convergence, but comparative static analysis requires much more structurepreferably, a closed-form solution for the equilibrium strategies. Calvó-Armengol and de Martí provide such a closed-form solution within the familiar quadraticnormal framework. In this paper, the authors address a question in the theory of teams that combines a coordination problem with a problem of information aggregation. The members of the finite team have symmetric payoff functions that depend both on an underlying state of nature θ and the actions chosen by the other members of the team. More precisely, each team member receives a private signal and chooses a scalar action to minimize a weighted average of the action's distance from the state θ and from the other players' actions.
The authors first study a game without communication, where the players observe only their private signals and where actions are chosen simultaneously. Because the payoff function is quadratic and the random variables are normally distributed, there is a unique equilibrium. The authors show that the equilibrium actions are a function of what they call a knowledge index, which can be defined in terms of the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of signals and the relative weights on the distance functions. The knowledge index captures the concerns of the players about predicting θ and the values of the actions of others. The linearity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies allow the authors to derive comparative static properties and to show how welfare depends on the parameters of the model. The second part of the paper examines the flow of information through a network. The possibilities for communication are represented by a network (directed graph). The players to whom a player is directly connected (including the player herself) constitute her neighborhood. Each agent now receives a signal that is equal to the average of the private signals in her neighborhood (her own private signal is included in the average). In this sense, communication is exogenous rather than endogenous.
The details of the network structure turn out to be important. It can be shown by example that adding an extra link may reduce welfare. Specifically, this is a possibility if the quality of the private signals is high relative to the prior information and if the incentive to coordinate with other players is very high. Intuitively, the problem arises because the coordination motive emphasizes the importance of symmetric information. Additional information that leads to asymmetries among players may also lead to miscoordination and thus, while the players' ability to predict θ improves, their ability to coordinate declines. It is difficult to characterize optimal networks in general, but in special cases it is possible to show that the optimal network is star-shaped.
There is an interesting exercise at the end of the paper where the authors consider more than one round of communication. At each round, players communicate the average of the signals they have previously received without taking into account the duplication (i.e., double counting) of information. This "boundedly rational" process is biased, giving more influence to betterconnected agents (as in DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel 2003), but it does converge. The analysis in this paper suggests that the optimal network is a regular (symmetric) one.
There are many interesting directions in which to take this work. One, mentioned by the authors, is to model communication as a dynamic game. (In the static game, players receive information only from their immediate neighbors; receiving information from their neighbors' neighbors requires successive rounds of communication.) This has been done by Gale and Kariv (2003) for a model of herd behavior, but the communication involved here is more complex because the payoff functions are more complex. Perhaps the most interesting questions concern the application of this model. The authors interpret it as a model of organizational behavior but offer little justification for this interpretation. By assuming that communication takes the form of exogenous signals, the authors have ruled out the possibility of design: they allow comparisons among networks but do not allow comparisons of different message spaces. The present framework may be too rigid to capture the self-designing nature of a firm in which managers consciously try to overcome communication problems by developing new channels of communication and coordination.
Norbert Maier and Marco Ottaviani study the impact of transparency on welfare in a common-agency model with two principals who offer linear incentives. The context is one in which a single agent takes an unobservable action (say, he exerts effort) that affects two principals each of whom privately observes a (contractible) signal of effort. The principals are risk neutral, the agent is CARA risk-averse, the signals are normally distributed, and attention is restricted to linear contracts. The authors compare welfare in this private contracting context with what can be attained in the "transparent" context where principals share their signals. It is shown that transparency may be welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, depending on the alignment of the information and the interests of the principals. With no transparency, the principal who observes the higher-quality signal can design more powerful incentives for the agent whereas the principal who cares less for the agent's effort will tend to provide lower incentives. The result, roughly, is that if the quality of signals and the interests of the principals are aligned (i.e., if the principal who cares more also has better information) then private contracting is good, because it avoids the free-riding that would obtain in a transparent regime (where the slopes of the incentive schemes of principals are strategic substitutes). Otherwise, information sharing will improve welfare. In the model, the efficient information regime emerges as an equilibrium outcome in which each principal receives a fixed share of the total surplus generated in the different regimes. This paper has a parallel in the literature on oligopolies with information sharing. In that case, however, the efficient information regime need not emerge in equilibrium (see Vives 1999, Chap. 8) .
Eugenio Miravete undertakes an empirical study of the pricing strategies of U.S. cellular telephone carriers between 1984 and 1992 in search of evidence of strategic complementarities. The concept of supermodularity has proven to be most useful in economic theory, but relatively little has been done to make empirical use of the concept. In this paper, Miravete searches for evidence of strategic complementarities by looking at the pricing strategies of U.S. cell-phone carriers between 1984 and 1992. More precisely, the author is interested in understanding the number of different tariffs offered by carriers in markets consisting of a single incumbent and a single entrant.
There is wide variation in the numbers of tariffs offered, but the correlation between the number of tariffs offered by different firms in the same market is strongly positive. This could be evidence of strategic complementarity or it could be the result of heterogeneity in the different markets. The strategy of the paper is to develop a method of econometric estimation that allows one to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. More precisely, Miravete represents the discrete, data-generating process using a Gaussian copula function with double Poisson marginal distributions. This model accommodates the observed underdispersion (positive correlation) in the numbers of tariffs but also allows for negative correlation. The model's flexibility is one of its chief advantages. In contrast, the multivariate models of count data that are available in the literature rule out the possibility of negative correlation. The other advantage of this model is its ease of implementation. Miravete claims that estimation is "fast and easy" in stark contrast to the existing literature on multivariate counts, which normally requires heavy numerical integrations.
The author reports that "the estimates are generally robust across specifications," that there is evidence of unobserved heterogeneity, and that the distribution of actual plans is underdispersed whereas the distribution of effective (undominated) plans is overdispersed. In conclusion, "the results support the idea of strategic complementarity regardless of whether we consider the total or just the effective tariff options offered."
The evidence for the existence of strategic complementarities is very interesting and should be a spur to further research. There are many questions still to be answered. What is the source of the strategic complementarity, and how can it be modeled? Is there data available that would allow the estimation of a "structural" model of competition? The dynamic dimension of competition should also be studied. Each of the markets is observed three times in this sample, so there is some information available on the evolution of competition in individual markets as well as across markets. The model underlying the estimation procedure is essentially static. What we are observing, however, is a repeated game wherein strategic complementarity in the stage game does not necessarily translate into strategic complementarity in the dynamic game.
Clearly, we are close to the beginning of serious empirical investigation into strategic complementarity. Miravete himself is a pioneer in this field. Many important and exciting questions remain to be addressed. The method introduced in this paper needs to be exploited more widely, but there is also a need to go beyond a descriptive approach.
Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino study herd behavior in financial markets experimentally. The importance of informational efficiency in markets is well understood, but in recent years it has been challenged empirically and theoretically. One strand of this research addresses the phenomenon of herd behavior, in which investors imitate the behavior of other investors instead of using their own private information to forecast the market and invest accordingly. There are many empirical studies that attempt to analyze herd behavior, but unfortunately they do not distinguish between truly imitative behavior ("following the herd") and the clustering that occurs when many individuals respond similarly to a public signal, for example. In fact, it is extremely difficult to study herd behavior using market-generated data because the information available to market participants is never directly observed. This is all the more reason to study herd behavior experimentally in a laboratory setting, as Cipriani and Guarino have done.
Models of herd behavior in financial markets are different from the models of herd behavior introduced by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) . Avery and Zemsky (1998) point out that, in a variant of the GlostenMilgrom (1985) model, market prices aggregate publicly available information and so informed investors can profit only by trading on the difference between their private information and the publicly available information. For this reason, an informed trader has an incentive to condition his trading strategy on his private information, thus revealing it (provided his private valuation of the stock differs from the market price).
Informational cascades (in which traders do not condition their trading strategy on their private information) are a possibility if there is uncertainty about the occurrence of an information event-that is, about whether or not traders are informed. In that case the market maker will update his beliefs less quickly than the informed traders, and it may be that all traders, those with good signals and those with bad signals, have valuations that lie on the same side of the market price. Then all traders will want to trade in the same direction (either all buying or all selling) regardless of their private information.
Cipriani and Guarino develop an innovative experimental design to investigate markets with uncertainty about informational events. There are four main innovations in their paper. For the first time, they experimentally test a model in which informational herd behavior is theoretically possible. Previous studies of information aggregation in markets (Cipriani and Guarino 2005; Drehmann, Oechssler, and Rider 2005) use experimental designs based on models of markets in which informational herding is theoretically impossible. Second, Cipriani and Guarino use professionals from the financial sector (traders, analysts, etc.), rather than the usual undergraduates, as subjects. The third innovation is their method of eliciting subjects' strategies. In the experimental market, subjects trade one after another and are allowed to condition their trades on the history of trades and prices. Instead of assigning each subject to a fixed point in the decision-making sequence, as in the traditional herd model, in each period Cipriani and Guarino require every subject who has not yet traded to make a decision. Then one of the remaining subjects is selected at random to have his or her trade implemented. This method elicits more decisions than the standard method (if there are n subjects, it yields n! instead of n decisions). Finally, in addition to confirming the existence of herd behavior in situations where it should rationally occur, the authors find evidence of contrarian behavior. In particular, some subjects trade against the publicly revealed information regardless of their private information, presumably because they suspect some irrationality on the part of other traders. The paper's methodological and empirical innovations make for a fascinating contribution to the literature on herd behavior.
